This paper applies nonparametric estimators to examine countries'
Introduction
A vast amount of researchers have examined the role of government and institutions and their influence on economic growth. Acemoglu et al. (2003) have found that weak institutions are the cause for slow economic growth, corruption, political instability and low investments. Easterly and Levine (1997) reach a similar conclusion about the slow growth while Baumol (1990) argues that institutions influence entrepreneurship's activities and determine whether they are productive or corrupted. Chang (2011) challenges the argument that institutions have a significant positive, direct effect on growth.
However, Boettke et al. (2011 ) criticize Chang's (2011 results by stating that property rights have a direct effect on economic growth while policies have an indirect effect on growth. La Porta et al. (1999) argue that economic growth is not affected only by economic institutions but also by political and cultural factors. Przeworski and Limongi (1993) support that politics affect growth. Specifically, the size of government affects negatively growth, whereas government expenditures affect it positively. . Djankov et al. (2003) point out that government is a key factor for the protection of property rights and as a result to economic growth, because government can effectively protect them but also can violate them. La examine two institutional aspects which promote general freedom. They have found that independent justice promotes economic freedom while constitutional review promotes political freedom.
Several authors (Rose, 1990; Matsuo, 1998; Rentz, 1998; Komarek et al., 2011; LaBelle, 2012) highlighted the importance and the role of governance and institutions on reducing countries' emission levels and increase countries' environmental quality. According to Panayotou (1997) the relationship of environmental quality and income growth depends among other factors on government policies and institutions. Dinda (2004) emphasizes the authority's capacity to implement environmental regulation across countries as a main determinant of the economic growth-environmental quality relationship. Grossman and Krueger (1995) also consider government policy as an important factor of environmental quality pointing that as poor countries develop and become richer there is an increasing demand for environmental quality and 'environmental stringency' through governance and political institutions.
Furthermore, Arrow et al. (1995) and Kaufmann et al. (1998) recognize the need of inclusion of policy variables in order to describe the income-environment relationship throughout the growth process and the role of institutions. Institutional quality or governance, according to Kaufmann et al. (1999) , includes firstly the process by which the authority is selected, secondly the government's ability to manage the resources and implement sound policies and finally the respect of the public for the institutions.
During the last two decades several variables for measuring governance (or institutional quality) have been presented in the literature. For instance Hall and Johnes (1999) following Knack and Keefer (1995) have used an index from Political Risk Services, the government antidiversion policies index consisting of the average from five categories. This measure has also been used by Acemoglu et al. (2001) and Glaeser et al. (2004) . Moreover, Hall and Johnes (1999) employed the index of Sachs and Warner (1995) in relation to the openness of international trade. Rodrik et al. (2002) and Glaezer et al. (2004) apply a combined index of government effectiveness constructed by Kaufmann et al. (2003) while Dollar and Kraay (2003) use an index which measures the quality of institutions constructed by Kaufmann et al. (2002) . Knack and Keefer (1995) measure institutions using two political instability proxies. The first measure, political violence, is introduced by Barro (1991) and is measured by revolutions and coups, and assassinations, while the second measure is based on Gastil index of democracy 1 . Finally, another approach is Business International (BI) indices which include corruption index used by Mauro (1995) .
Given the fact that carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) emissions are the main determinant of countries' environmental quality which play a major role over global warming and climate change (Harvey, 1996; Ezcurra, 2007) , our study uses for the first time the World Governance Indicators as have been provided by the World Bank in order to evaluate in a nonparametric context G-20 (Group of twenty) countries' carbon dioxide emissions and governance relationship.
A brief review of the relative literature
Governance (or institutional quality) is a multidimensional concept to be expressed by one indicator. Hence governance can be characterized by several aggregated indicators that each of them focuses on one specific dimension.
Institutions contribute to the determination of public choice and therefore are of major importance in the enforcement and implementation of environmental quality regulation. Thus, the sustainability of natural resources and the conservation of the environment interact directly and indirectly with the institutional quality.
According to Deacon (1999) , governments determine the implementation of the regulation of treatment of natural resources and thus the exclusion of the institutional quality of the estimation of the environmental quality might lead to biased results. Bhattaray and Hammig (2001) Another dimension of institutional quality is the corruption determinant.
According to Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2006) Still, the above determinants play a crucial role for the protection of property rights which are important for economic growth. Bhattacharya and Lueck (2009) estimate the importance of two types of property rights (monotonic and non-motonic)
in the framework of the income-environmental quality relationship which is confirmed in terms of an EKC hypothesis.
Data and Methodology

Description of variables
In order to examine the carbon dioxide emissions-governance relationship we use data for the time period 1996-2010, concerning the Group of twenty (G-20) countries 3 . These are countries from different development stages (i.e. they are advanced, developing and emerging countries) which together represent around 90% of global GDP, 80% of global trade and two-thirds of the world's population. In addition it is well-known that they are responsible for producing the majority of worldwide carbon dioxide emissions and for designing, implementing and imposing global environmental policies.
In our analysis we are using as a metric of pollution for G-20 countries' carbon dioxide emissions (CarDio) measured in metric tones (International Energy Agency-IEA, 2011). In addition we are using the six governance measures (World Governance Indicators-WGI) provided by the World Bank as proxies of countries' governance quality (Kaufmann et al., 2006) . The institutional quality indicator constitutes of six governance indices which are measured in units ranging from about -2.5 to 2.5. Higher values are related to higher governance quality. The indicators are constructed using an unobserved components methodology (Kaufmann et al., 2010) .
More analytically 4 :
Voice and Accountability (VoicAccoun) captures perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media.
Political Stability and Absence of Violence (PolStab) measures the perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including domestic violence and terrorism.
Government Effectiveness (GovEff) captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies.
Regulatory Quality (RegQual) captures perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development. Rule of Law (RuLaw) captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.
Control of Corruption (ConCorr) captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests. Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used in our analysis.
As can be observed from the standard deviations there are a lot of disparities among the nineteen countries under consideration. In addition, we follow the natural grouping between the nineteen nations (see table 1) adopted in South Korea meeting in 2010. This grouping has been in place for country members to be able to decide which nation gets to chair for the G-20 leaders' meeting for a given year (Carin, 2010) 5 .
As has been mentioned by Huynh and Jachno-Chavéz (2009) nonparametric techniques are suitable for analyzing WGI since will take into consideration differences among countries in different regions, making comparisons valid in a unifying estimation framework. In addition they highlight that when analyzing WGI measures in a nonparametric setting there is no need of correction of standard errors and/or testing techniques since the governance measures are generated from parametric models and their precision is dominated by the overall slow rate of convergence of the nonparametric estimators applied (Sperlich, 2009 ). 
Equation (1) presents the conditional mean of the underlined relationship and as can be observed ( ) . g is assumed to be a smooth continuous but otherwise unknown function and therefore is not restricted to robust linear specifications.
Nonparametric analysis
Let the variable CarDio be the dependent variable denoted by i y and the independent variables (VoicAccoun, PolStab, GovEff, RegQual, RuLaw and ConCorr) be represented as i X which is a q-vector. We also assume that all are continuously distributed with a joint density ( ) In addition ( ) .
K is a product kernel function and ( )
. k is a univariate kernel function that satisfies the following conditions:
In equation (5 Finally, the local constant estimator or the Nadaraya (1964), Watson (1964) nonparametric estimator can be obtained as: 
, which is the leaveone-out kernel estimator of ( ) i X g and
is a weight function (for details see Li and Racine (2007), pp. 4-14) .
Empirical results
Following Huynh and Jachno-Chavéz (2009) we construct conditional density plots between the six governance measures and countries' carbon dioxide emissions. Figure 1 presents the conditional density plots 6 between countries' carbon dioxide emissions and the six WGI variables. More analytically, subfigure 1a presents the conditional density plot of CarDio with VoicAccoun, subfigure 1b with PolStab, 6 For bandwidth selection we have used the least-squares cross validation approach (Hall et al., 2004) . The results presented using partial regression plots (carbon dioxide emissions curves) since nonparametric methods do not yield scalar estimates of marginal effects (Huynh and Jachno-Chavéz, 2009, p. 128) . In addition the significance nonparametric tests (analogue to the standard parametric ttest) introduced by Racine (1997) , Racine et al. (2006) , Li and Racine (2007) and Racine (2008) have been applied in order to check the significance of the governance variables on explaining the variations of countries' carbon dioxide emissions for each examined year (i.e. 1996, 2000, 2005 and 2010) . The results obtained for each repressor using cross-validated bandwidths and 399 bootstrap replications reveal statistical significance for all the variables at different significance levels (1%, 5% and 10%). The analytical results from the significance tests are available upon request. Generally, these curves are presenting the carbon dioxide emissions path of a country member of G-20 for a specific year in respect to a particular governance measure. In addition to the carbon dioxide emissions curves, the plots are also presenting the 90% bootstrap confidence intervals. Therefore, as can be observed the curves represent slices of the fitted hyperplane conditional on the examined variables.
In the case of VoicAccoun the results reveal that regardless the examined year a negative relationship (almost monotonic) of countries' voice accountability and carbon dioxide emissions is revealed. As a result the higher the VoicAccoun levels within the country the lower its carbon dioxide emissions will be.
In addition when looking at the case of Political Stability and Absence of
Violence (PolStab) ConCorr and CarDio levels exhibit an inverted 'U' shape. As can be observed the results are mixed and subject to G-20 countries' governance changes over the years.
Therefore, in order to 'grasp' the dynamic effects over the examine period (1996-2010) we apply the same analysis for all the years having in total 285 observations. However since it takes into account the entire period rather than certain years, the dynamic effects of the underline relationships can also be observed more clearly.
Furthermore 90% bootstrap confidence intervals based on 399 replications are presented 8 . In addition to figure 3, table 2 presents the obtained p-values of the nonparametric significance test following the bootstrap algorithms highlighted by Racine (1997) , Racine et al. (2006) , Li and Racine (2007) and Racine (2008) . Table 2 presents also the selected bandwidths following the local constant (lc) least squares cross-validation approach introduced by Li and Racine (2007, p. 69) .
The results reveal that the governance variables are statistical significant However after that point the relationship appears to be increasing up to certain RuLaw level (1.5) and then decreasing again. Similar results are also reported for the case of control of corruption (subfigure 2f). There is a negative relationship up to a certain ConCorr level (0.8) which after that point the effect becomes positive, indicating that higher control of corruption increases countries' CarDio levels. But when ConCorr levels reach 1.7 then the effect after that point becomes negative again, indicating that a further increase on countries' control of corruption will decrease their carbon dioxide emissions levels. The results reveal with the most emphatic way that the carbon dioxide emissions-governance relationship is highly nonlinear and appears that countries' higher governance quality does not always result to lower carbon dioxide emission levels.
Besides In contrast to the parametric approaches, the flexible functional form of the nonparametric estimators applied, as they relax the assumptions of linearity, additivity and no interaction among the variables, helped us to reveal important features of the data. In addition the nonparametric methodology applied may help policy makers to understand "hidden" tradeoffs between countries' carbon dioxide emission levels and governance measures.
More analytically, our empirical results reveal that the carbon dioxide emissions -governance relationship is nonlinear. In addition it appears that different factors of governance influence differently countries' emissions levels. In respect to policy implications the results reveal that increased government quality does not ensure a reduction of countries' CO 2 emissions.
Finally, it appears that countries' regional and economic development variations are shaping the way and the number of governance measures influencing G-20 countries' carbon dioxide emissions levels. Therefore, CO 2 emissions reduction policies should be directed towards those governance measures which are specific to countries' unique regional and development factors.
